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February 20, 2024

VIA EMAIL AND FEDEX

Stephen Fraidin Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP 200 Liberty Street New York, NY 10281

Re: Crown Castle, Inc.

Dear Steve:

I write in response to your letter of February 14 regarding the cooperation agreement between Crown Castle Inc. ("**CCI**" or the "**Company**") and Elliott Investment Management L.P. and certain of its affiliated entities (collectively, "**Elliott**") dated December 19, 2023 (the "**Cooperation Agreement**").

Your letter is replete with factual inaccuracies and completely distorts the nature of the relationship between CCI and Elliott, including, among others:

• Your letter alleges that Elliott had "substantial power" at the Company before the Board approved the Cooperation Agreement and that at least "six of the twelve

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*NOT ADMITTED TO THE NEW YORK BAR

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directors ... have either been selected by Elliott or with its direct input and consent." These statements are wholly inaccurate. Before the execution of the Cooperation Agreement, Elliott had no representation whatsoever on CCI's Board. Elliott had no relationship with—and zero input in selecting—the three directors (Tammy K. Jones, Kevin A. Stephens and Matthew Thornton, III) who joined CCI's Board in 2020 after Elliott's earlier engagement with CCI. In fact, Elliott had no knowledge that the Board was even interviewing any of these three directors. As a matter of reality, every director on CCI's Board was fully independent from Elliott at the time the Cooperation Agreement was approved.

- Your letter suggests that the Board has "appeased" Elliott by giving it "more" Board seats. Untrue. In reality, the Board negotiated intensely with Elliott before entering into the Cooperation Agreement. Elliott initially asked the Board to add five new directors and identified seven candidates to fill those positions.
 Following extensive negotiations with Elliott, the Board agreed to appoint only two individuals Elliott had proposed—Jason Genrich, an Elliott employee, and Sunit Patel, an independent director.
- Your letter suggests that Bradley Singer was selected by Elliott for the Board or appointed as a result of Elliott's input. Not the case. Mr. Singer was not recommended to the Board by Elliott nor was Elliott aware of the Board's discussions with Mr. Singer prior to the commencement of its engagement with CCI in November 2023.
- Your letter asserts that Tony Melone was "endorsed by Elliott" and "may be beholden to Elliott." The reality is that Mr. Melone, who had been a director of the Company since 2015, had no connection with Elliott and was appointed by the Board as the interim CEO with zero input from Elliott on December 6, 2023, after Jay Brown notified the Board that he would be stepping down as CEO. This occurred nearly two weeks before the Cooperation Agreement was signed and before any Elliott-affiliated individuals joined the Board. Elliott had no knowledge it was in progress and learned about it from the public announcement.

Contrary to your letter, the Cooperation Agreement was the product of vigorous negotiations and internal CCI discussions—including at eight Board meetings—and was designed to limit the rights afforded to Elliott. Indeed, the Board negotiated Elliott's initial demand of five Board seats down to two. There was no need to form a special committee because no members of the Board had a relationship with Elliott—material or otherwise—or other form of potential conflict. Your assertion that Elliott was a related party at the time the Cooperation Agreement was approved because of its Board representation when it had none, its ownership of shares despite no shareholder being permitted to own more than 9.8% of CCI's shares by virtue of CCI's status as a REIT, and its "publicly assertive behavior" is absurd as a matter of both fact and law.

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The Company rejects your request to submit the Cooperation Agreement to a stockholder vote. There is no such requirement under Delaware law and it would highly unusual, if not unprecedented, to expend resources to seek stockholder approval of this type of common contractual arrangement. Indeed, we are aware of over 70 cooperation agreements between U.S. public companies and activist investors that were entered into in 2023 alone and, as far as we could determine, none of them were submitted for stockholder approval.

As you note, "[s]tandstill and cooperation agreements are common" and "are often sensible approaches to resolving conflicts with activist investors." Here, in a routine exercise of business judgment, the Board determined that entering into the Cooperation Agreement with Elliott was in the best interests of CCI's stockholders.

Very truly yours,

Scott A. Barshay

cc:

P. Robert Bartolo Board Chair, Crown Castle Inc.